BUREAU OF PRISONS

Strategic Approach Needed to Prevent and Address Employee Misconduct

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2025

GAO-25-107339

United States Government Accountability Office

A report to congressional requesters.

For more information, contact: Gretta L. Goodwin at GoodwinG@gao.gov

What GAO Found

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has policies and procedures on employee misconduct but has not fully communicated them. In June 2024, BOP updated its Standards of Employee Conduct and provides ongoing training on these standards. However, BOP is not sharing and using feedback from employees on the training, which is inconsistent with leading practices. Doing so would better position BOP to improve the training’s design, delivery, and overall effectiveness in preventing employee misconduct.

Additionally, BOP uses orientation handbooks and signs posted in facilities to inform incarcerated individuals how to report certain employee misconduct. However, the handbooks and signs discuss sexual misconduct rather than a broader range of allegations, such as contraband and physical abuse. Developing a communication strategy to fully inform incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses that affect their health and safety could increase awareness about the standards BOP is trying to uphold and help ensure facility safety and employee accountability.

Further, BOP has not fully incorporated data analysis and planning into how it manages employee misconduct. For example, BOP collects employee misconduct data but does not assess these data to identify trends in misconduct across more than 2 years. By developing and implementing an approach to routinely and fully assess employee misconduct data over more than 2 years, BOP could better focus its efforts to prevent and address misconduct.

BOP increased staff and took other steps to reduce its employee misconduct caseload, but about 37 percent of the 12,153 cases open as of February 2025 had been unresolved for 3 years or longer. BOP’s approach to investigating and disciplining employee misconduct does not include establishing milestones or designating responsibilities to key officials. Implementing a comprehensive plan with these elements would help BOP allocate the resources necessary for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases, achieve desired results, and enhance safety and efficiency.

Note: Includes cases reported from October 2013 through February 2025 that remained open as of February 27, 2025, when BOP retrieved the data from its system. While BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs investigates most cases, a small number are investigated by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General or another body, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, BOP receives and investigates thousands of employee misconduct allegations. These include sexual abuse of incarcerated individuals, unprofessional conduct, and failure to follow policy. The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that BOP’s operational challenges have resulted in lengthy investigations and backlogged cases.

GAO was asked to review BOP’s efforts to prevent and address employee misconduct. This report examines (1) the extent to which BOP has established and communicated policies and procedures on employee misconduct and (2) the extent to which BOP has incorporated data analysis and planning into misconduct management, among other issues.

GAO analyzed BOP policy and data from October 2013 through February 2025 and interviewed BOP officials. GAO also interviewed staff and incarcerated individuals from three BOP complexes, selected in part to represent a variety of locations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making eight recommendations to BOP, including the following:

·         Develop an approach for sharing and using employee feedback on relevant training.

·         Develop a communication strategy to fully inform incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses that affect their health and safety.

·         Routinely and fully assess misconduct data to identify and address trends.

·         Implement a comprehensive plan for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases.

 

 

 

 

 

 

BOP	Bureau of Prisons
DOJ	Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Correctional Complex
OIA	Office of Internal Affairs
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
PREA	Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003

September 29, 2025

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
The Honorable Richard J. Durbin
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate

The Honorable Cory Booker
United States Senate

The Honorable Jon Ossoff
United States Senate

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is a component within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Its more than 35,000 employees are responsible for the custody, care, safety, and rehabilitation of approximately 155,000 individuals serving federal sentences across nearly 120 facilities.[1] BOP’s mission is to foster a humane and secure environment and ensure public safety by preparing these individuals for successful reentry into their communities.

BOP holds its employees and contractors to standards that guide their performance of official duties and participation in outside activities.[2] BOP receives and investigates thousands of allegations of employee misconduct each year. These allegations involve criminal misconduct, such as sexual and physical abuse of incarcerated individuals. They also involve administrative infractions, which can include unprofessional conduct and failure to follow policy. In some instances, misconduct can threaten the safety and security of federal facilities and the individuals working and incarcerated therein. DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that BOP has faced insufficient staffing levels that hindered its ability to investigate and discipline employee misconduct. Such challenges have resulted in lengthy investigations and an accumulation of pending employee misconduct cases.[3]

We have previously reported that leadership turnover and long-standing staffing challenges represent a serious threat to the safety of employees and incarcerated individuals. Due to these and other persistent challenges, we added the area of Strengthening Management of the Federal Prison System to GAO’s biennial High-Risk List in 2023.[4] We reported in the latest High-Risk update in February 2025 that BOP had made some progress in key challenge areas. However, staffing gaps and leadership stability continue to be central concerns and affect BOP’s ability to monitor persistent issues such as employee misconduct.[5]

You asked us to review issues related to BOP’s efforts to address employee misconduct.[6] Specifically, this report examines:

1.    The extent to which BOP has established and communicated policies and procedures on employee misconduct;

2.    The extent to which BOP has incorporated data analysis, strategic planning, and evaluation mechanisms into its management of employee misconduct; and

3.    The roles and responsibilities of other DOJ components in investigating and prosecuting BOP employee misconduct.

To examine the extent to which BOP established and communicated policies and procedures on employee misconduct, we assessed BOP’s Standards of Employee Conduct and other policies on reporting and disciplining employee misconduct.[7] We also evaluated BOP’s policy for investigating allegations of employee misconduct against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[8] Additionally, we reviewed signs and other materials that inform incarcerated individuals about how to identify and report employee misconduct. We evaluated these materials to determine the extent to which they adhered to a key practice for developing a communication strategy.[9] Further, we examined the extent to which BOP’s efforts to evaluate Standards of Employee Conduct training followed leading practices for assessing strategic training in the federal government.[10]

To examine BOP’s use of data analysis, strategic planning, and evaluation mechanisms in managing the misconduct workload, we analyzed data on employee and contractor misconduct allegations BOP received from October 2013 through February 2025. We selected this period to identify changes over the past 10 complete fiscal years and to obtain the most current information. Among other things, we examined allegations by volume, offense type, and facility. We also calculated the number and the timeliness of open cases.

Additionally, we reviewed BOP documentation to evaluate BOP’s use of data over the past 10 complete fiscal years against its Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) program statement, its strategic goal and objectives, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[11] This documentation included annual reports on the misconduct workload from fiscal years 2014 through 2023, the most recent report available during our audit work. Further, we interviewed officials about BOP’s efforts to manage the employee misconduct workload and evaluated these efforts against sound planning practices and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[12] Additionally, we interviewed officials and reviewed BOP documentation regarding efforts to evaluate investigation timeliness and assessed these efforts against criteria from The Standard for Program Management.[13]

To determine various DOJ components’ roles and responsibilities in investigating and prosecuting BOP employee misconduct, we reviewed program statements and guidance related to BOP employee misconduct investigations and interviewed officials from each component. To understand the number and type of BOP employee misconduct investigations conducted across DOJ, we analyzed data from OIG on BOP employee and contractor misconduct allegations received from October 2013 through March 2025. We selected this range to identify changes over the past 10 complete fiscal years and obtain the most current information.

We assessed the reliability of the BOP and OIG data used in our analyses by (1) reviewing relevant documentation, (2) interviewing knowledgeable officials on their management of the data, and (3) testing for obvious errors. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for describing the employee misconduct workload for BOP from October 2013 through February 2025 and for OIG from October 2013 through March 2025.

To address all three objectives, we interviewed BOP officials with roles and responsibilities in preventing, investigating, and disciplining employee misconduct. Additionally, we visited three Federal Correctional Complexes to observe their operations, interview leadership, local union representatives, and other officials, and gather perspectives from 13 correctional officers and 12 incarcerated individuals.[14] We selected these facilities based on security level, geographic location, gender of the incarcerated population, and known misconduct issues, as indicated by BOP data and publicly available reports. The perspectives of those we interviewed are not generalizable to all BOP offices or facilities. However, they provide illustrative examples of, and important insights about, employee misconduct prevention and response approaches throughout the bureau. Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in greater detail.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2024 to September 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

BOP employees are subject to certain standards and prohibitions, which may be based in law, regulation, or a matter of good ethical principles. BOP considers any violations of these standards and prohibitions to be employee misconduct and developed the Standards of Employee Conduct to prevent and address misconduct.[15] In addition, the bureau developed mechanisms for investigating reports of potential misconduct—also called allegations—and disciplining employees.

Various offices across BOP’s organizational structure have roles and responsibilities in addressing employee misconduct. Figure 1 generally describes these roles at various organizational levels.

^aAdverse actions are employee misconduct penalties that may include no less than a 15-day suspension, removal, or demotion. Disciplinary actions are penalties that are 14-day suspension or less.

Other DOJ components may also conduct employee misconduct investigations or provide support to the investigations, if necessary. For example, BOP may refer criminal and serious administrative allegations to OIG for further investigation.

Reporting Employee Misconduct

As table 1 illustrates, BOP employees and incarcerated individuals can report employee misconduct in several ways. For example, BOP employees and incarcerated individuals can report employee misconduct directly to supervisors and investigators. Once the facility’s warden learns of the misconduct, they will notify OIA of the allegation to start the investigation process. BOP employees and incarcerated individuals may also report allegations of misconduct to other DOJ components, such as the OIG and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

BOP employees

Incarcerated individuals

·          Report to a supervisor or manager. ·          Contact Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) investigator(s) stationed at the facility, if available. ·          Report violations to OIA directly via email. ·          Use the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) toll-free hotline or via its public website. ·          Report directly to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.a ·          Report to the facility Chief Executive Officer (typically the warden).

·          Contact OIA investigator(s) stationed at facility, if available. ·          Report in person to any employee. ·          Submit an Inmate Request to Staff Member form or mail a letter to the Chief Executive Officer (typically the warden), Regional Director, or BOP Director. ·          Report directly to OIG via the computer network BOP provides for incarcerated individuals or by mail. ·          Ask someone outside the facility to report on their behalf (e.g., lawyer, friend, family member) through BOP’s public website.

Source: GAO analysis of BOP documentation and interviews. | GAO‑25‑107339

^aThe U.S. Office of Special Counsel is an independent federal investigative and prosecutorial agency. Its primary mission is to protect federal employees from retaliation for whistleblowing.

Categorizing Allegations

When OIA receives an allegation, it records it in a case management system and categorizes the allegation based on severity.[16] Specifically, if the allegation warrants investigation and has sufficient information, OIA opens a case and categorizes it. If the allegation does not warrant investigation or lacks sufficient information, OIA records it as a complaint.[17] Table 2 provides an overview of each category, including examples.

Allegation type	Description	Examples
Category 1 cases	Allegations of criminal misconduct that may constitute a prosecutable offensea	Physical abuse, bribery, fraud or extortion, theft, trafficking in illegal drugs
Category 2 cases	Allegations of violations of policies or laws that may not result in criminal prosecution but constitute serious misconduct	Threatening assault, discrimination, sexual harassment, and workplace violence
Category 3 cases	Allegations of administrative misconduct that have minimal impacts on facility operations but could result in disciplinary action	Unprofessional conduct, refusal or failure to follow instructions or procedures

Source: GAO analysis of Bureau of Prisons and Office of the Inspector General processes. | GAO‑25‑107339

Note: Bureau of Prisons’ Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) reviews all allegations and categorizes them based on the severity. OIA refers all Category 1 and 2 to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for its review and shares Category 3 allegations in monthly batches, though OIG does not formally review these allegations. If OIG declines to investigate an allegation, it will defer to OIA, which will then review the allegation to determine whether it will open an administrative investigation. In cases where OIG receives allegations directly from BOP employees and incarcerated individuals or their families, they will review them and determine whether to further investigate, refer them to OIA, or pursue another outcome.

^aCategory 1 cases may also include allegations of serious administrative misconduct by a Department of Justice employee of the rank of GS-15 or above.

After opening an investigation, OIA will either refer the case to the OIG for its review or will conduct its own administrative investigation:

·         Refer the case to the OIG. OIA refers Category 1 and 2 allegations to OIG for its review.[18] Additionally, OIA sends monthly batches of Category 3 allegations to OIG for recordkeeping purposes.[19] OIG generally handles allegations for investigation that constitute criminal or serious misconduct—typically category 1 and 2 cases. After OIG reviews the case, it may notify OIA that it will continue investigating the allegation or send the case back (defer) to OIA.[20]

·         Conduct an administrative investigation. OIA handles Category 3 cases and other cases that the OIG defers, which can include Categories 1 and 2. Once OIG defers a case to OIA, OIA considers it for an administrative investigation.[21]

If OIG decides to investigate an allegation, BOP cannot take further action unless the OIG approves it. During OIG’s investigation, it may also refer the allegation to other DOJ investigative components, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which may join OIG for the investigation, or to state or federal prosecutors for their consideration.

Employee Disciplinary Process

BOP’s employee disciplinary process consists of two phases—the investigation phase and the disciplinary phase. Figure 2 shows the steps in each of these phases.

Investigation Phase

In most instances, OIA assigns its investigations to OIA investigators located at the facility where the alleged misconduct occurred.[22] OIA investigators gather evidence, in part by interviewing the subject of the allegation, witnesses, and any victims.

When interviewing BOP employees who are subjects of allegations, OIA conducts a compelled interview—one in which an employee is required to respond fully and truthfully to questions or face agency disciplinary action, including dismissal. In accordance with BOP guidance, prior to a compelled interview, investigators are to issue a warning to inform employees of their obligations and rights.[23]

Ultimately, OIA investigators use the evidence collected to determine whether the allegation should be sustained or not sustained.[24]

Discipline Phase

Once investigators sustain an allegation, facilities coordinate with the appropriate regional office and legal staff to impose a disciplinary action. This coordination includes drafting a disciplinary proposal letter[25] and getting approval from the regional office and the Employment Law Branch.[26] In addition, BOP sends the disciplinary review letter to the employee and must allow sufficient time for the employee to respond.[27] After the disciplinary proposal letter is approved, BOP issues a final decision letter and imposes disciplinary action. These disciplinary actions can include an official reprimand, suspension from work, or removal from the position.[28]

Note: According to Bureau of Prisons documentation, an allegation is sustained if it is supported by admission or a “preponderance of evidence”. A “preponderance of evidence” is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q). Further, an allegation is not sustained if there is insufficient evidence to support the allegation and there is no additional contrary evidence to refute the allegation and the allegation cannot otherwise be reasonably dismissed as without merit or substance.

^aAs of June 2023, the Bureau of Prisons implemented a new initiative streamlining the disciplinary letter review process. According to Bureau of Prisons officials, no decision has been made with respect to the discipline letter review initiative. The bureau is continuing to collect data related to the initiative through the end of June 2025.

BOP Has Policies and Procedures to Address Employee Misconduct but Has Not Fully Communicated Them

BOP Updated Its Standards of Employee Conduct in 2024

BOP revised its policy describing employees’ conduct standards and prohibitions.[29] Previously updated in 2013, the Standards of Employee Conduct describes BOP employees’ conduct responsibilities, prohibited activities, and general standards to abide by.[30] In June 2024, BOP revised its Standards of Employee Conduct after determining that the 2013 version required updating. As table 3 shows, the revisions include new and altered policies specific to employees’ conduct and responsibilities.

Change type	Examples
Revisions to policy elaborating on employee conduct and responsibility	·          Additional language specifying illegal drugs prohibited. ·          New rules specific to social media use. ·          New section elaborating on supervisor-subordinate relationships. ·          New language emphasizing BOP employees’ role in recognizing and preventing employee misconduct amongst their peers.
Revisions to listed disciplinary offenses and penalties	·          Inclusion of additional offenses. ·          Modifications of existing offenses, including changes to offenses’ descriptions, range of penalties, and reckoning period.a

Source: GAO analysis of Bureau of Prisons documentation. | GAO‑25‑107339

Note: In February 2025, BOP removed the term “gender identify” from the 2024 version of the Standards of Employee Conduct to ensure consistency with Executive Orders issued by the Executive Office of the President of the United States.

^aThe reckoning period is defined as the period of time following the date that management becomes aware of the offense, during which that offense can be used to determine the sanction for a subsequent offense.

The 2024 version includes updates to its Standard Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties—a table that BOP’s Human Resources and Employment Law Branch, among others, use to determine the appropriate discipline for employees depending on the offense committed. The 2024 version also describes a total of 73 offenses, with 19 of these added during the revision process.[31] These 19 include stand-alone offenses that were previously part of broader categories, new offenses based on new rules (e.g. violations to social media-use standards), and split offenses based on employee circumstances. For example, national union officials stated that the earlier standards (from 2013) penalized correctional officers for missing their assigned rounds regardless of their reasons or excuse. The revised 2024 standards distinguish between a correctional officer who does not perform assigned rounds at all, and one who was late to assigned rounds because previous rounds took longer than expected due to an emergency or other exigent circumstances. The 19 additional offenses include the following:

·         An offense specific to unprofessional conduct related to race, sex, disability, or other immutable characteristics,[32]

·         An offense for inadvertent or mistaken use of a prescription drug without a valid prescription, and controlled substances,[33]

·         More specific offenses that focus on different types of contraband, such as firearms and non-firearm weapons, and

·         An offense focusing on the act of intimidating or threatening incarcerated individuals or compelling them to act or violate a rule.[34]

For purposes of summarizing the 73 offense categories, we categorized them into eight domains, as shown in figure 3.

Note: The figure illustrates GAO’s categorization of the 73 offenses, including 19 additional offenses, BOP describes in the 2024 version of the Standards of Employee Conduct. In February 2025, BOP removed the term “gender identity” from the 2024 version of the Standards of Employee Conduct to ensure consistency with Executive Orders issued by the Executive Office of the President of the United States.

Based on our interviews, BOP employees had generally positive views of the revisions overall. Specifically, of the 13 correctional officers we spoke with across the three BOP facilities in our sample, 11 stated that the revised standards set clear expectations.[35] Additionally, of the 13 correctional officers, 10 noted that the revised standards clearly described the consequences of violating BOP policies.[36]

BOP’s Policy Describes Procedures for Conducting Compelled Interviews but Does Not Cite the Correct Legal Decision

During administrative investigations of employee misconduct cases, OIA conducts compelled interviews of BOP employees suspected of misconduct. However, the bureau’s program statement on investigative policy does not correctly cite the applicable legal decision when referring to employees’ rights.[37] A compelled interview means that employees are required to respond fully and truthfully to questions. If they do not, they face agency disciplinary action, including dismissal for failure to do so. However, any statements from the compelled interview, or the results of those statements, may not be used against the employee in a later criminal prosecution, unless the employee knowingly and willingly makes false statements. According to OIA officials, OIA policy only provides for compelled interviews during administrative investigations of BOP employees accused of employee misconduct, not voluntary interviews.

In our review of BOP’s program statement on investigative policy, we found that BOP does not cite the correct legal court decision when referring to employees’ rights during a compelled interview. Instead of citing the holding of Kalkines v. United States,[38] which is the applicable legal basis for the administrative warning, OIA cites the holding of Garrity v. New Jersey.[39] See appendix II for further context on the Kalkines and Garrity court cases.

As described in table 4, warnings provided prior to compelled and voluntary interviews are derived from the holdings in Kalkines v. United States and Garrity v. New Jersey, respectively. The warnings for each are distinct and inform interviewees of the potential ramifications of refusing or participating in the respective interview.

Warning	Example	Type of Interview
Kalkines warninga	You are being questioned as part of an administrative investigation. You will be asked a number of specific questions concerning your official duties, and you must answer these questions to the best of your ability. Failure to answer completely and truthfully may result in disciplinary action, including dismissal. Your answers and any information derived from them may be used against you in administrative proceedings. However, neither your answers nor any information derived from them may be used against you in criminal proceedings, except if you knowingly and willfully make false statements.	Compelled Interview
Garrity warningb	You are being asked to provide information as part of an administrative investigation. This is a voluntary interview and you do not have to answer questions if your answers would tend to implicate you in a crime. No disciplinary action will be taken against you solely for refusing to answer questions. However, the evidentiary value of your silence may be considered in administrative proceedings as part of the facts surrounding your case. Any statement you do choose to provide may be used as evidence in criminal and/or administrative proceedings.	Voluntary Interview

Sources: GAO analysis of Bureau of Prisons documentation and relevant court decisions. | GAO‑25‑107339

^aKalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391 (1973).

^bGarrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).

In our discussion with BOP, officials acknowledged the error in the policy. However, they stressed that the language in their interview form ensures that employees receive accurate information prior to a compelled interview. Specifically, BOP officials stated that OIA investigators provide a form to BOP employees prior to the start of an interview which describes employees’ rights during compelled interviews. In our review, we concluded that the form correctly describes employees’ rights during a compelled interview without incorrectly attributing it as a Garrity warning. Further, OIA officials said they tell investigators not to provide a verbal explanation of the rights described in the form to eliminate any chance of sharing incorrect information. See appendix III for a snapshot of the OIA’s investigative policy and form.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives.[40] This includes obtaining relevant data from reliable internal and external sources.

The errors in BOP’s current program statement on investigative policy risk misleading and confusing OIA investigators and BOP interviewees. Until BOP correctly cites the underlying legal decision, the bureau cannot be assured that every investigator understands its procedures for misconduct investigations and that interviewees fully understand their rights and obligations when OIA investigators conduct compelled interviews.

By revising its investigative policy to correctly cite Kalkines v. United States, BOP will accurately state the applicable legal basis for the administrative warning for compelled interviews. Doing so will avoid the risk of confusion among investigators and interviewees regarding the type of interview being conducted, BOP’s procedures for conducting those interviews, and employees’ rights during administrative investigations.

BOP Has Not Fully Informed Incarcerated Individuals About Employee Conduct Offenses Affecting Health and Safety

BOP has two mechanisms for communicating to incarcerated individuals the types of employee misconduct they may observe and ways to report that misconduct—an orientation handbook provided to each incarcerated individual and signage posted across the facility.[41] However, despite BOP’s Standards of Employee Conduct identifying 73 categories of misconduct offenses, the two mechanisms communicate offenses related only to sexual misconduct and do not include others affecting health and safety.

For example, in our analysis of the orientation handbooks from the three facilities we visited, we found that the handbooks discussed employee misconduct only in the context of sexual abuse and harassment, which represent a subset of the 73 categories of misconduct offenses. In contrast, the handbook omits other offenses that could affect incarcerated individuals’ health and safety. In our review of the 73 employee misconduct offenses, we identified four examples of Category 1 offenses that affect incarcerated individuals’ health and safety that the orientation handbooks do not address.[42] These four are:

·         Physical abuse of an incarcerated individual or excessive use of force involving an incarcerated individual.

·         Receiving gifts, favors, or bribes in connection with official duties.

·         Introduction of a weapon (non-firearm).

·         Introduction of a firearm.

According to BOP officials, while facilities have some discretion about what to include in their handbooks, the sections discussing employee offenses are standardized, specifically those addressing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA).[43]

 

Physical media posted at two Bureau of Prisons Facilities (BOP) Signage posted in a housing unit at Federal Correctional Complex Victorville in California. Sign posted in a housing unit at Federal Correctional Complex Hazelton in West Virginia. Source: Bureau of Prisons (photos).  |  GAO‑25‑107339

Additionally, we observed that signs posted in the three facilities notified incarcerated individuals solely about how to report sexual misconduct, including the phone number to call to make the report. None of the signs in the three facilities noted that incarcerated individuals could report other types of employee misconduct. According to BOP’s program policy, signage is standard across BOP to ensure information is visible to incarcerated individuals.[44] See Appendix IV for an example of a misconduct-related sign posted in the facilities we visited.

At one of the facilities we visited, an incarcerated individual told us he is aware of how to report sexual misconduct from the information described in the orientation handbook. However, he was not fully aware of the other types of employee misconduct offenses that may be committed against him that are reportable. For example, he stated that during a lockdown, guards used profanity or threatened to kick him if he did not lie on the ground. While he felt that those actions could be misconduct offenses, he was not aware of the full standards to which employees should be held. He also said that the signs posted around the facility appear to be applicable to reporting employee offenses that are criminal, and not necessarily for lesser types of employee misconduct. Appendix V contains further examples of the perspectives incarcerated individuals shared during our interviews.

BOP officials said that facilities use orientation handbooks and signs posted in the facilities primarily to inform incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses. Further, BOP officials stated that the bureau’s policy requires signs to be posted in facilities providing the methods to report an incident of sexual abuse, regardless of whether it was an incarcerated individual or employee perpetrator. Officials added that although the orientation handbooks provide information on sexual misconduct and methods to report it, their overall strategy for communicating misconduct is discretionary.[45]

Our past work on organizations achieving results showed that creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to building trust, ensuring consistency of message, encouraging two-way communication, and providing information to meet specific needs of employees and stakeholders.[46]

By limiting the information communicated with incarcerated individuals to only certain types of employee misconduct offenses, BOP is curtailing the scope and nature of allegations that incarcerated individuals might otherwise report. Additionally, this could lead to underreporting of misconduct and result in BOP lacking a full understanding of the nature and extent of employee misconduct. Developing a communication strategy to fully inform incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses that affect their health and safety would increase awareness about the standards BOP is trying to uphold and help ensure facility safety and employee accountability.

BOP Does Not Routinely and Systemically Use Employee Feedback on Standards of Employee Conduct Training

BOP’s central office designs and develops the bureau’s Standards of Employee Conduct training curriculum, along with a tool for collecting feedback. According to BOP officials, its facilities are then responsible for delivering the training. However, BOP officials stated that its facilities are not routinely and systematically sharing employee feedback with the bureau’s central office to make informed decisions on improving the training curriculum’s design, delivery, and overall effectiveness.

According to BOP officials, the Standards of Employee Conduct training entails specific modules in two phases for new hires.[47] There is also annual training for all BOP employees. Additionally, BOP officials told us the central office designed a course evaluation tool to solicit participants’ feedback.[48] The tool gauges (1) whether course content met participants’ expectations and the stated course objective, (2) if sufficient time was allotted, (3) whether training delivery was adequate, and (4) if the instructor seemed knowledgeable about the subject matter and was well prepared.[49]

According to BOP officials, the central office developed the feedback tool, and the bureau’s facilities are responsible for disseminating it and reviewing the feedback results.[50] Additionally, BOP officials stated facilities have the discretion to report any or all feedback to the appropriate regional office.[51] According to BOP officials, in instances when the regional offices receive feedback from the bureau’s facilities, they are required to share it with the Central Office. However, officials responsible for developing and updating the national curriculum for the Standards of Employee Conduct told us they have not received any feedback from facilities or regional offices on training relevant to the curriculum. As a result, they have made no changes to national curriculum based upon employee feedback provided through the evaluation tool.[52]

During our interviews with 13 officers at the three facilities we visited, six had taken the training and provided us with their views.[53] According to these six officers, they would like to see specific improvements to the annual training. For example, the officers would like to spend more time discussing real-life scenarios to help them to better understand how to apply the Standards of Employee Conduct in their operating environment. From their perspectives, this would better prepare them for the challenges they experience in the facility. Additionally, the officers told us they would like clearer explanations about the types of employee misconduct offenses and discipline that can result from those offenses.

Similarly, in our conversations with the local unions from the three facilities, all three union presidents noted that the annual training does not provide detailed information on the Standards of Employee Conduct. One local president specifically recommended that the annual training should include more scenario-based training that teaches staff how to anticipate and handle situations that arise with incarcerated individuals.

BOP officials said its facilities have not systematically and routinely shared employee feedback with the regional and central offices because the facilities have the discretion to make minor edits to the Standards of Employee Conduct training curriculum. For example, facilities can add content such as scenario discussions and make changes to the design. However, officials added that the facilities cannot remove content from the standardized training.

Leading practices for assessing strategic training in the federal government state that agencies should evaluate and assess the extent to which training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and results. Specifically, agencies should among others (1) systematically plan for and evaluate the effectiveness of their training and development efforts, (2) use the appropriate analytical approaches to assess their training and development programs, and (3) incorporate evaluation feedback into the planning, design, and implementation of their training and development efforts.[54]

Without a routine and systematic approach for sharing and leveraging feedback specific to the Standards of Employee Conduct training with appropriate offices, BOP is missing opportunities to ensure the training meets both its stated objectives and employee expectations and needs. By developing such an approach, BOP will be positioned to improve the training’s design, delivery, and overall effectiveness in preventing employee misconduct.

BOP Has Not Fully Incorporated Data Analysis, Planning, and Evaluation Mechanisms into Misconduct Management

BOP Collects Employee Misconduct Data, but Conducts Limited Analysis of Trends

Although BOP collects data on employee misconduct, it conducts limited analysis of trends in the volume, type, or location of allegations. Specifically, OIA stores allegations of employee misconduct in its case management system and uses the data to release annual, publicly available reports on the number and type of offenses alleged in that fiscal year, among other information. However, these reports lack data on the facilities and regions where the allegations originated and the total number of open cases. Further, while they compare employee misconduct data from the current fiscal year to the prior fiscal year, they do not identify trends across more than 2 years. OIA officials said they have not considered conducting further analysis of trends in employee misconduct. Moreover, officials across the bureau said they do not use OIA’s annual reports to inform operations, such as the development of training.

Our analysis of BOP data from fiscal years 2014 through 2024 demonstrates that the data BOP already collects can provide insight into misconduct trends by type, volume, and facility. Specifically, the total number of employee misconduct allegations reported per year ranged from 7,658 to 12,168 from fiscal years 2014 through 2023 before increasing to 14,907 in fiscal year 2024. According to BOP officials, the increase may have been driven by allegations resulting from widespread sexual misconduct at Federal Correctional Institution Dublin and BOP’s increased emphasis on encouraging employees and incarcerated individuals to report misconduct, among other factors.[55] Additionally, figure 4 shows that certain types of misconduct allegations were consistently prominent from fiscal years 2014 through 2024, while others increased during this period. For example:

·         The most frequently alleged types of misconduct each fiscal year were generally unprofessional conduct and failure to follow policy.[56]

·         Allegations of employees being absent without leave and failing to follow their supervisors’ instructions generally increased from fiscal years 2014 through 2024. According to BOP officials, failure to follow supervisors’ instructions can often take the form of refusing to work a mandatory overtime shift.[57] Mandated overtime can cause low morale, fatigue, and make it challenging for employees to meet family obligations, according to union officials and correctional officers at the three BOP facilities we visited.

Note: This figure represents the ten most frequently alleged offenses reported from fiscal years 2014 through 2024. The total number of allegations reported per fiscal year, including those pictured above, ranged from 7,658 in 2014 to 14,907 in 2024. The Bureau of Prisons Office of Internal Affairs received allegations of 146 other types of offenses during this period. Other frequently alleged offenses included unprofessional conduct of a sexual nature, the appearance of inappropriate relationships with incarcerated individuals, and failure to report rule violations.

As previously discussed, OIA categorizes allegations as complaints, which do not warrant investigation, or as cases, which do warrant investigation. Cases fall into one of three categories based on the severity of the allegation: (1) criminal misconduct, (2) serious misconduct, and (3) administrative misconduct. Because one case or complaint can include multiple employees and multiple allegations per employee, the volume of cases and complaints is lower than that of allegations. Additionally, one employee may be the subject of multiple cases or complaints.

Figure 5 shows that the number of cases and complaints per year generally increased over time, from 5,921 total cases and complaints reported in fiscal year 2014 to 9,769 cases and complaints in fiscal year 2024. Specifically, complaints nearly doubled between fiscal years 2019 and 2020. Overall volume remained subsequently higher from fiscal years 2021 through 2024 than in the years preceding 2020, and BOP opened a higher number of cases and complaints in fiscal year 2024 than in any prior year we examined. As previously discussed, allegations reported per year also increased during this period. Cases outnumbered complaints in each fiscal year, which means OIA determined that the majority of allegations it received included enough information to warrant an investigation.

Note: While BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs investigates most cases, a small number are investigated by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General or another body, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This figure excludes 49 observations that were missing a value in the data field that distinguishes between cases and complaints.

Moreover, our analysis demonstrated that some facilities had consistently high employee misconduct workloads. Table 5 shows the ten facilities with the highest number of employee misconduct complaints and cases from October 2013 through February 2025. These facilities generally received hundreds of cases and complaints per fiscal year. Across the 99 BOP facilities that received misconduct allegations during this time, OIA opened a total of 86,193 cases and complaints from October 2013 through February 2025, at an approximate average of 542 cases and 329 complaints per facility.[58]

Facility	State	Number  of cases reporteda	Number of  complaints reportedb	Total cases and complaints reported
Coleman Federal Correctional Complex (FCC)	Florida	2,584	2,010	4,594
Beaumont FCC	Texas	1,850	1,552	3,402
Florence FCC	Colorado	1,839	1,229	3,068
Yazoo City FCC	Mississippi	1,759	637	2,396
Butner FCC	North Carolina	1,578	637	2,215
Victorville FCC	California	1,426	585	2,011
Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention Center	New York	1,639	307	1,946
Tucson FCC	Arizona	1,014	908	1,922
Pollock FCC	Louisiana	1,197	694	1,891
Atlanta U.S. Penitentiary	Georgia	1,097	732	1,829
Total	Not applicable	15,983	9,291	25,274

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. | GAO‑25‑107339

Note: This table represents the ten correctional facilities with the highest number of employee misconduct cases and complaints reported from October 2013 through February 2025. Eight of these were complexes that include multiple co-located facilities, and all ten were large facilities that incarcerate more than one thousand individuals. During this period, BOP received a total of 86,193 allegations across 99 facilities, excluding regional and central offices and other settings. This table excludes eight observations that were missing a value in the data field that distinguishes between cases and complaints.

^aBOP categorizes allegations as cases if they include sufficient information to warrant investigation, according to officials. While BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs investigates most cases, a small number are investigated by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General or another body, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

^bComplaints are reports of misconduct that BOP determines it will not investigate because the reports do not have all necessary information or do not formally allege a misconduct offense.

According to officials, OIA’s case management system is designed to store and manage files, rather than facilitate analysis. Officials from another BOP unit—the Information Technology and Data Division—said that the system does not enable users to easily retrieve all data elements without certain technical capabilities.[59] They also stated that their division can retrieve more detailed data from the system, such as the data we analyzed, but OIA has not asked for their assistance in retrieving data. Additionally, OIA officials stated that their focus is on investigating cases, not data analysis. Likewise, they said that OIA does not have the resources or expertise for data analysis. However, BOP’s Information Technology and Data Division and Program Review Division have analytical responsibilities.

BOP policy states that OIA is responsible for maintaining a database of all employee misconduct allegations to provide information about trends and ensure accountability.[60] BOP has also prioritized the use of data as part of the bureau-wide strategic goals it established in November 2024.[61] In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to achieve the organization’s objectives and make informed decisions, which includes processing data into quality information that is appropriate, complete, and accessible.[62]

Without robust data analysis, BOP has not been able to capitalize on the information it already collects and fulfill OIA’s obligations. Developing an approach to routinely assess misconduct data, look for trends across years and within and across facilities, and identify challenge areas could better inform BOP’s management of the employee misconduct workload. For example, BOP could identify increasing or persistent trends in certain offense types that may indicate broader misconduct issues at specific facilities or across the agency. Implementing targeted approaches to address trends and challenge areas could help focus BOP’s efforts to prevent misconduct and decrease related workloads. For example, understanding these trends could help BOP target its training by (1) informing facility employees of the most prevalent types of misconduct and how to avoid them and (2) providing investigators and officials responsible for imposing discipline with strategies to address those prevalent case types expeditiously.

BOP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Plan to Ensure Accountability for Investigating and Disciplining Employee Misconduct Cases

BOP has taken steps to reduce the number of open employee misconduct cases, but has not created a comprehensive plan to hold relevant offices accountable for their roles in investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases. Our analysis of BOP OIA’s data identified 12,153 employee misconduct cases that were reported from October 2013 through February 2025 and remained open as of February 2025, as shown in figure 6.[63] The majority of these cases were awaiting action from various BOP offices involved in the employee disciplinary process.

Note: This figure includes employee misconduct cases that were reported from October 2013 through February 2025 and remained open as of February 27, 2025, when BOP retrieved the data from its system. As such, cases reported prior to October 2013 are not included.

^aCases pending other action included those undergoing review of a completed case file and those awaiting an investigation by central Office of Internal Affairs investigators, who typically investigate more complex cases than facility-assigned investigators.

^bCases pending Office of the Inspector General action were either under consideration for investigation or actively being investigated by that agency.

According to BOP officials, the large caseload accumulated as a result of OIA’s understaffing and its previous structure. Prior to a recent realignment, investigators were responsible for investigating allegations of incarcerated individuals’ misconduct as well as employee misconduct, and they reported to the wardens of their facilities. According to BOP officials, wardens did not consistently prioritize employee misconduct cases.

Since 2023, the bureau has taken the following steps to reduce the pending caseload.

·         Realigning and increasing relevant staff. BOP realigned all employee misconduct investigators to report to OIA, rather than to wardens. According to OIA officials, this change—which took place in 2023—streamlined the reporting process and focused investigators’ responsibilities solely on employee misconduct cases. BOP also increased the staffing of OIA by 119 positions, adding 32 new facility investigator positions as well as additional supervisory and support positions. Additionally, BOP added 14 positions to the Office of General Counsel Employment Law Branch and designated certain positions to focus solely on reviewing discipline letters.

·         OIA strike teams. According to officials, OIA improved an existing effort to deploy “strike teams” of investigators to temporarily assist facilities with high caseloads throughout 2023 and 2024. This effort preceded the 2023 OIA realignment, but did not consistently produce results due to a lack of preparation and strategy, according to officials. Since the realignment, OIA has ensured that strike teams prepare more extensively to maximize their time onsite. For example, before traveling, strike teams acquire and review case files from the facility, schedule investigative interviews, and ensure the local union is available if employees have requested representation in those interviews.

Additionally, OIA began collecting data on the number of strike teams deployed and the number of cases they closed. According to the data, OIA deployed 16 strike teams to 11 different facilities in fiscal year 2024, closing a total of 1,085 cases. Officials said while they do not have a formal method of evaluating this effort, they consider a strike team successful when it reduces enough cases for the facility’s assigned investigators to manage their caseload without further assistance.

·         Discipline review initiative. In June 2023, BOP began an effort to expedite the discipline review process for cases that would result in a penalty no more severe than a 10-day suspension, with some exceptions.[64] Prior to the initiative, both the Employment Law Branch and the Human Resources units at the appropriate regional offices reviewed all letters proposing and finalizing disciplinary penalties.[65] Currently, the Employment Law Branch does not review letters meeting the initiative’s criteria.

Following these steps, BOP closed more cases in fiscal year 2024 than in any other year from 2014 through 2023. According to BOP documentation, cases are generally closed in the system after (1) OIA completes an investigation and determines no allegations are sustained, or (2) OIA finds that at least one allegation is sustained—that is, upheld by evidence—and BOP imposes disciplinary action on the employee. Specifically, BOP closed 6,842 cases in fiscal year 2024, compared to 3,902 cases in fiscal year 2023. These cases may have been created in the same fiscal year they were closed or in a prior fiscal year. See appendix VI for further data on the outcomes of cases closed during this period.

However, as discussed above, a substantial pending caseload persists across the investigative and disciplinary phases of the employee disciplinary process, and BOP has not developed a comprehensive plan for investigating and disciplining misconduct cases. We have previously reported that sound planning calls for organizations to develop plans that (1) identify necessary activities, resources, and milestones and (2) designate roles, responsibilities, and coordination within the organization. These practices help organizations achieve desired results and ensure accountability. Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate the agency’s performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks.[66]

The steps BOP has taken to reduce the pending caseload have left some gaps. For example:

·         BOP has not taken a comprehensive approach to understanding the size of the pending caseload across all phases. BOP has generally reported to Congress and the public on only the number of cases that are pending investigation, without including those that have completed the investigation phase and are awaiting disciplinary action. According to officials, OIA defines its case backlog only in terms of cases that have been pending investigation for 180 days or longer, as the disciplinary phase is not its responsibility. While our analysis identified more than 12,000 open cases across all phases of the employee disciplinary process, BOP has externally reported a smaller sum of cases pending investigation only. For example, in response to follow-up questions related to GAO’s High-Risk work, BOP reported that it had 7,290 open cases as of November 2024.

·         BOP has not met internal goals for addressing the employee misconduct caseload. In a March 2023 response to a DOJ OIG report, BOP officials stated that they expected to reduce the number of cases pending investigation within 2 years, by March 2025.[67] BOP officials repeated this goal in a congressional hearing and GAO interviews throughout 2024, extending the 2-year window multiple times.[68] Most recently, OIA’s goal was to reduce the number of cases pending investigation by April 2026. According to BOP officials, the Employment Law Branch has eliminated its backlog of discipline letters received before September 2022. However, BOP has not established a goal for addressing the cases that are pending disciplinary action, or the caseload across all phases as a whole.

·         BOP has not fully assessed the discipline review initiative’s effectiveness. According to BOP officials, the discipline review initiative was not developed with specific time frames, goals, or methods of collecting data to assess its effectiveness in reducing the number of discipline letters pending review. BOP officials said they had begun assessment efforts in February 2025.

·         BOP faces relevant vacancies. According to documentation, sixteen of the 119 positions BOP added to OIA in 2023 were vacant (13 percent) as of July 2025, as were six of the 14 positions BOP added to the Employment Law Branch in 2023 (43 percent).[69] Additionally, according to officials at three of the six regional offices, the discipline review initiative has been effective at improving the timeliness of discipline. However, the initiative has also increased their workload. BOP added one position to each regional Human Resources office in February 2024. However, in summer 2024, officials at four of the six regional offices discussed vacancies that they felt impacted their ability to manage the discipline review workload.

According to BOP officials, the bureau’s primary approach for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases consists of

·         hiring more employees in some areas,

·         enhancing the direction and oversight of the strike team initiative, and

·         streamlining the discipline review process for a subset of cases.

However, these efforts do not constitute a comprehensive plan, according to sound planning practices and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, because they do not include milestones or designate key officials’ responsibilities. Documenting such a plan that includes these key elements would help BOP identify and allocate the resources necessary for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases. Ensuring accountability for implementing that plan across all phases of the employee disciplinary process would help BOP achieve desired results and enhance safety and efficiency.

BOP Does Not Have a Method for Comprehensively Evaluating Processing Times for Employee Misconduct Cases

BOP does not have a method for comprehensively evaluating case processing times with the goal of improving timeliness. Our analysis of BOP data demonstrated that the number of years between BOP receiving a report of employee misconduct and closing the case in its system (i.e., processing time) has improved in recent years. For example, the number of cases that BOP closed in less than 1 year increased from 1,501 cases in fiscal year 2022 to 2,106 cases in 2024 (see fig. 7). However, it is not clear whether the improvement in processing time can be attributed to the steps BOP recently took to address the pending employee misconduct caseload because BOP has not comprehensively evaluated the timeliness of its process.

Note: We define processing time as the number of years between the dates BOP received a report of employee misconduct and closed the case in its system. This figure includes only the cases reported to BOP from fiscal years 2014 through 2024 and excludes four cases that had erroneous data (i.e., cases in which the closure date preceded the reported date). While BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs investigates most cases, a small number are investigated by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General or another body, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Although processing times improved for cases opened in recent years, our analysis demonstrated that timeliness remains a challenge, as many older cases remained open as of February 2025. Specifically, of the 12,153 open employee misconduct cases, 37 percent were 3 or more years old (see fig. 8).

Note: This figure includes only the cases that were reported from October 2013 through February 2025 and remained open as of February 27, 2025, the date that Bureau of Prisons retrieved the data from its system. As such, cases reported prior to October 2013 are not included. While the Bureau of Prisons’ Office of Internal Affairs investigates most cases, a small number are investigated by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General or another body, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

According to BOP officials, the timeliness of employee misconduct cases can vary in the investigation and disciplinary phase based on the nature and complexity of cases. For example, in the investigation phase, cases may involve numerous witnesses and evidentiary materials to gather and review, which can prolong investigations. Additionally, witnesses or the subject of the investigation may be unavailable to be interviewed, such as when they are on extended medical leave or delayed due to scheduling conflicts or union representation issues.[70] In the disciplinary phase, cases may take longer to review due to a lack of availability or experience among the facility Human Resources staff who prepare discipline letters, according to regional office officials.[71]

According to BOP documentation, officials, and union representatives, lengthy processing times create significant challenges. For example, older cases are more difficult for OIA to investigate because the subject or witnesses may not recall the alleged incident or may have retired or resigned, limiting BOP’s ability to hold employees accountable. According to union officials, facilities may place employees on administrative leave or reassign them to different duties while they are under investigation. This impacts the facility’s staffing levels because those employees are unable to fulfill their normal duties.[72] Finally, these officials stated that lengthy processing times can cause employees to question whether BOP takes misconduct seriously.

BOP does not have a method for evaluating case processing times because its policies do not direct any office to comprehensively evaluate timeliness for each step in the employee disciplinary process with the goal of improving it. Specifically, in our review of BOP Program Statements that establish roles and responsibilities in the employee disciplinary process, we found that there was no directive for any BOP office involved in the disciplinary process to establish or evaluate time frames.[73]

BOP has established target time frames for the completion of some steps in the employee disciplinary process. For example, OIA expects investigators assigned to BOP facilities to complete their investigations within 120 days of receipt. OIA tracks this information in its case management system and uses it to evaluate investigators’ performance. Additionally, BOP’s Program Review Guidelines establish target time frames for facilities’ Human Resources offices. These include (1) a 75-day time frame for sending disciplinary proposal letters to the appropriate regional office after receiving a sustained case from OIA and (2) a 20-day time frame for sending final letters to the employee being disciplined after receiving approval from the Employment Law Branch.[74] As part of routine internal audits, facilities must report on whether a sample of their discipline cases met these time frames. Further, the Employment Law Branch has established target time frames to review proposal letters within 45 days of receipt and final letters within 15 days of receipt.

Although some offices involved in the employee disciplinary process follow target time frames, BOP does not have a method for comprehensively evaluating the extent to which misconduct cases meet those targets. Additionally, BOP has not established target time frames for some steps in the employee disciplinary process. For example, while officials from two of the six regional offices said they had established internal time frames for reviewing discipline letters, those time frames differed by office, and officials from the remaining four regional offices said they had not established time frames.

The Standard for Program Management states that meaningful measures can help management determine whether outcomes are delivered in a timely manner and, if necessary, propose changes to the program.[75] Establishing target time frames for each step in the employee disciplinary process and developing a method of routinely evaluating the extent to which BOP is meeting targets would help the bureau to track timeliness and identify factors that may be contributing to lengthy processing times. Developing and implementing an approach to addressing those factors would better position BOP to improve the overall timeliness of the employee disciplinary process, resolve cases efficiently, and hold employees accountable.

Multiple DOJ Components Have Roles in Investigating and Prosecuting Allegations of BOP Employee Misconduct

Multiple DOJ agencies and offices have roles in investigating and prosecuting allegations of BOP employee misconduct—see Table 6. However, most allegations involving employee misconduct start with OIA and are referred to the OIG. The OIG then reviews and determines investigative responsibility.

Component	Roles and responsibilities
BOP Office of Internal Affairs (OIA)	·          Reviews and categorizes employee misconduct allegations; shares serious and prosecutable allegations with OIG for their review and potential investigation.a ·          Conducts administrative investigations that may result in discipline for allegations that OIG declines.
Office of the Inspector General (OIG)	·          Conducts investigations of serious and criminal allegations of BOP employee misconduct, either independently or jointly with other DOJ investigative agencies.b ·          Refers cases as appropriate to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and other federal and state prosecuting entities.
Civil Rights Division	·          Supports other components in some misconduct investigations. ·          Investigates and prosecutes, as circumstances warrant, specific matters involving civil rights offenses.c
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	·          Partners with OIG to conduct some BOP employee criminal misconduct investigations, particularly those related to contraband smuggling, use of excessive force, sexual abuse, or other civil rights offenses.
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices across the 94 federal districts	·          Prosecutes criminal employee misconduct cases following OIG or FBI referral. These offices also coordinate with OIG and other investigative agencies (as necessary) throughout the course of an investigation.
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys	·          Provides logistical and administrative support to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices across the country.

Source: GAO analysis of data and documentation collected from and interviews with the Department of Justice agencies. | GAO‑25‑107339

^aOIG ultimately determines whether to accept the allegation for investigation or refer it back to BOP OIA.

^bIn addition to receiving allegations from OIA, OIG may receive allegations through its reporting hotlines for incarcerated individuals, from other government agencies, or from members of the public or nongovernment entities.

^cCivil Rights Division investigates and prosecutes, as circumstances warrant, civil rights offenses such as failure to protect incarcerated individuals from physical or sexual abuse, failure to provide incarcerated individuals with adequate medical and mental health care, use of excessive force, or discrimination on the basis of a protected class.

As previously discussed, BOP reviews allegations of employee misconduct reported within BOP and categorizes them based on severity. According to BOP’s program statement, OIA refers all Category 1 and 2 allegations to the OIG for their review and shares Category 3 allegations in monthly batches for recordkeeping purposes.[76] Further, the program statement states that in some instances when criminal misconduct is alleged, BOP may refer the allegation to both the OIG and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In addition, OIG works with other DOJ components when investigating allegations. For example, OIG may refer the allegation to DOJ’s Civil Rights Division for review to determine whether a civil rights offense occurred. Further, OIG may refer a criminal misconduct case to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the appropriate district for potential prosecution before determining how to proceed with the investigation. According to OIG data, OIG conducted joint investigations into BOP employee misconduct with FBI and other DOJ investigative agencies from October 2013 through March 2025.

Of the components with a potential role, OIG is the most closely engaged in BOP misconduct investigations because it is responsible for reviewing thousands of allegations each year and investigating certain cases. As such, from October 2013 through March 2025, OIG received 83,082 allegations of BOP employee or contractor misconduct.[77] During this period, we found that OIG received about 63 percent of the allegations from BOP or another DOJ component, about 36 percent through its hotline, and one percent from other sources.[78]

OIG referred 76,777 (about 92 percent) of these allegations back to BOP for administrative investigation and accepted 3,917 (about 5 percent) for investigation, as shown in figure 9.[79] According to OIG officials, while it predominantly accepts allegations likely to constitute criminal misconduct, it may also accept some administrative allegations, such as when the subject of the investigation is a high-level supervisor or manager at or above the General Schedule-15 pay grade.

^aAllegations with other outcomes included those that were recorded as requests for information, consolidated with existing allegations, or referred to another OIG division or another agency.

Further, according to OIG data, the most common employee offenses the OIG investigated from October 2013 through March 2025 included introduction of contraband, sexual abuse, job performance failure, inappropriate relationships, and physical abuse (see fig. 10). Additionally, of the 3,917 investigations OIG conducted during this period, approximately 45 percent included allegations of more than one offense. For example, the contraband investigations that OIG conducted also included allegations of bribery or inappropriate relationships, among others.

Note: Investigations may include multiple alleged offenses. This figure represents only the ten most frequent primary offenses—or those deemed the most severe—that OIG investigated from October 2013 through March 2025. OIG has the authority to investigate Department of Justice employee misconduct allegations. According to officials, OIG predominately accepts allegations of criminal misconduct and misconduct committed by high-level supervisors or managers. OIG investigated a total of 3,917 Bureau of Prisons employee misconduct allegations during this period, including those pictured above. Other offenses included off-duty misconduct and prohibited personnel actions, among others.

^aFor example, this offense type could involve Bureau of Prisons employees engaging in inappropriate sexual relationships with subordinates or showing partiality toward incarcerated individuals.

^bThis offense type could involve making false verbal statements during an OIG investigation.

 

Examples of Recent Prosecutions of Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Employees From 2022 through 2025, a former BOP warden, chaplain, and eight correctional officers have been charged for sexually abusing incarcerated women at Federal Correctional Institution Dublin. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation jointly investigated the cases, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California prosecuted them. In November 2024, three former correctional officers admitted to violating the civil rights of an incarcerated individual at U.S. Penitentiary Hazelton. One officer physically assaulted the individual, while the second and third officers falsified reports and statements to conceal the assault. The OIG investigated the case and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of West Virginia prosecuted it. Source: Department of Justice documentation.  |  GAO‑25‑107339

Although the number of BOP employee misconduct allegations OIG accepts for investigation is relatively low, most of the cases it investigates result in referral for prosecution. Specifically, from October 2013 through March 2025, OIG referred approximately 73 percent (2,843 of the 3,917 investigations) for criminal prosecution at the federal or state level.[80] During that period, prosecutors accepted 1,323 or about 47 percent of cases and declined 1,441 or about 51 percent, while less than three percent did not have an outcome in OIG’s data system at the time of our request.[81]

Further, of the 1,323 cases accepted for prosecution from October 2013 through March 2025, 666 were adjudicated in criminal court with 93 percent or 619 resulting in a conviction—see Fig 11. As of May 2025, when OIG retrieved the data from its system, the remaining 657 BOP employee misconduct cases accepted for prosecution during this period had not been adjudicated in court.

Note: This figure represents misconduct allegations reported to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) from October 2013 through March 2025 and adjudicated in court before March 2025. Allegations reported prior to October 2013 are not included. Of the 1,048 cases accepted for prosecution and marked as closed in OIG’s data system during this period, 382 (36 percent) were missing a court outcome in the data system and are excluded from this figure. According to OIG officials, some of these cases are ongoing, while others were initially accepted for prosecution but later declined.

^aAccording to Department of Justice guidance, a pre-trial diversion is an alternative to the traditional criminal justice process that diverts offenders into a program of supervision and services. Participants who complete the program may qualify for dismissal or reduction of charges, among other outcomes. Participants who do not complete the program may be charged through the traditional process.

Conclusions

BOP’s employee misconduct allegations involve sexual abuse of incarcerated individuals, unprofessional conduct, and failure to follow policy. Misconduct of this nature increases risks to the safety and security of federal facilities. BOP established policies and procedures for addressing employee misconduct, but issues with how BOP communicates policies and uses data hinder its ability to implement these policies and procedures effectively.

To effectively communicate employee rights and responsibilities during misconduct investigations, it is important for BOP’s program statement to refer to the applicable legal decision and corresponding warning that guides the interview policy. Doing so will help BOP avoid confusion on the type of interview it is conducting, its interview procedures, and employees’ rights during administrative investigations. Further, by developing and implementing a communication strategy to fully inform incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses that affect their health and safety, BOP would likely increase awareness about the Standards of Employee Conduct to help ensure facility safety and employee accountability. In addition, BOP has not routinely shared employee feedback specific to the Standards of Employee Conduct training with all relevant offices, which makes it challenging for those offices to use the feedback to improve the training’s design, delivery, and overall effectiveness in preventing employee misconduct.

BOP collects data on employee misconduct and its investigative caseload, but it does not leverage these data in its efforts to manage the employee misconduct caseload. Developing an approach to routinely and fully assess employee misconduct data, identify trends and challenge areas, and implement targeted approaches to address those challenges would allow BOP to capitalize on the information it already has and fulfill OIA’s obligations. Further, documenting and implementing a comprehensive plan that establishes milestones and designates responsibilities to key officials for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases would help BOP ensure accountability in meeting its goal of reducing the employee misconduct caseload. Finally, by establishing target time frames, developing and implementing a method to evaluate whether it is meeting those targets, and addressing hindrances to doing so, BOP could better identify factors that may be contributing to lengthy processing times and improve the overall timeliness of the employee disciplinary process.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making the following eight recommendations to BOP:

The Director of BOP should revise BOP’s program statement on investigative policy to correctly cite Kalkines v. United States as the applicable legal decision for the administrative warning that OIA conveys before conducting compelled interviews. (Recommendation 1)

The Director of BOP should develop and implement a communication strategy that fully informs incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses that affect their health and safety. (Recommendation 2)

The Director of BOP should (a) develop a routine and systematic approach for sharing employee feedback specific to the Standards of Employee Conduct training with regional and central offices and (b) use this feedback to help improve its design, delivery, and overall effectiveness. (Recommendation 3)

The Director of BOP should develop and implement an approach to routinely and fully assess employee misconduct data, identify trends across more than 2 years and within and across facilities, and identify any challenge areas to help focus efforts to prevent and address employee misconduct. (Recommendation 4)

The Director of BOP, after implementing routine assessments of employee misconduct data, should implement targeted approaches to address the identified trends and challenge areas in employee misconduct. (Recommendation 5)

The Director of BOP should document and implement a comprehensive plan that establishes responsibilities, measurable goals, and milestones for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases to ensure accountability for meeting those goals. (Recommendation 6)

The Director of BOP should (a) establish target time frames for each step in the employee disciplinary process and (b) designate responsibilities for developing and implementing a method of routinely evaluating the extent to which it is meeting targets. (Recommendation 7)

The Director of BOP, after establishing target time frames for steps in the employee disciplinary process, should develop and implement an approach to identify and address any delays in the employee disciplinary process that hinder its ability to meet target time frames. (Recommendation 8)

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for their review and comment. BOP, on behalf of the department, concurred with all eight recommendations and described actions planned or underway to address them. BOP, OIG, the FBI, and the Civil Rights Division also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. BOP’s comments are reproduced in appendix VII.

BOP stated that it is committed to identifying misconduct—including waste, fraud, abuse, and violations of the BOP’s Standards of Employee Conduct—and holding accountable those who engage in such actions. As such, it has taken actions to address employee misconduct and prioritize responsiveness and accountability. Those actions include reorganizing OIA and reducing the backlog of employee misconduct cases, expediting investigations, and enhancing employee training—all of which we acknowledged in the report.

In response to recommendation 1, BOP stated that it will revise BOP Program Statement 1210.25, Office of Internal Affairs, to correctly cite Kalkines v. United States as the applicable legal decision for the administrative warning that OIA conveys before conducting compelled interviews. The actions BOP described, if implemented effectively, would address our recommendation.

In response to recommendation 2, BOP stated that it will develop and implement a communication strategy that fully informs incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses that affect their health and safety. Further, BOP stated that it will develop additional signage and amendments to the Inmate Admission and Orientation handbook that will specify the applicable policy to reference when health and safety related employee misconduct allegations arise. The actions BOP described, if implemented effectively, would address our recommendation.

In response to recommendation 3, BOP stated it will (1) develop a routine and systematic approach for sharing employee feedback specific to the Standards of Employee Conduct training with regional and central offices and (2) use this feedback to help improve its design, delivery, and overall effectiveness. BOP also described efforts it has begun to address the recommendation. For example, BOP’s Human Resources Management Division collaborated with its Office of General Counsel, Office of Ethics to develop a standardized evaluation form that was disseminated to all BOP Employee Development Offices. The actions BOP described, if implemented effectively, would address our recommendation.

In response to recommendation 4, BOP stated that it concurs with the recommendation to develop and implement an approach to (1) routinely and fully assess employee misconduct data, (2) identify trends across more than two years and within and across facilities, and (3) identify any challenge areas to help focus efforts to prevent and address employee misconduct. Additionally, BOP stated that OIA’s current Case File Manager system is not capable of trend and challenge area identification, and that a new system would be required for this purpose. In particular, BOP stated that implementing this recommendation will require significant additional resources. We maintain that developing and implementing an approach for assessing these data for trends, whether through a new Case File Manager system or other means, would support BOP’s efforts to prevent misconduct and decrease related workloads.

In response to recommendation 5, BOP stated that it concurs with the recommendation to implement targeted approaches to address the identified trends and challenge areas in employee misconduct. As stated earlier, because the Case File Manager system is not capable of trend and challenge areas identification, BOP noted that implementation of the recommendation will require significant additional resources.

In response to recommendation 6, BOP stated that it concurs with the recommendation to document and implement a comprehensive plan that establishes responsibilities, measurable goals, and milestones for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases to ensure accountability for meeting those goals. Additionally, BOP stated that the measurable success of the OIA realignment cannot be understated, and new goals, expectations, and responsibilities are being established as investigative timelines and total numbers continue to decrease. These actions BOP described, if implemented effectively, would address our recommendation.

In response to recommendation 7, BOP stated that it concurs with the recommendation to (1) establish target time frames for each step in the employee disciplinary process and (2) designate responsibilities for developing and implementing a method of routinely evaluating the extent to which it is meeting targets. BOP also stated that while it recognizes the importance of an efficient and expeditious adjudication process, it is difficult to establish firm deadlines for several reasons. For example, each case is unique, and it is impossible to anticipate the unique factors or complexities that may be involved or may impede timely adjudication of cases. As such, while timeliness is important, BOP will not compromise the integrity or defensibility of its disciplinary adjudications. We maintain that establishing target time frames for each step in the employee disciplinary process and developing a method to routinely evaluating the extent to which BOP is meeting targets would help the bureau to track timeliness and identify factors that may be contributing to lengthy processing times.

In response to recommendation 8, BOP stated that it concurs with the recommendation to develop and implement an approach to identify and address any delays in the employe disciplinary process that hinder its ability to meet target time frames. BOP also stated that it does have concerns about (1) the implementation of target time frames as part of the comprehensive plan and (2) the availability of resources may delay the resolution of this recommendation. However, BOP stated that its Office of General Counsel and Human Resources Management Division have begun evaluating options to address this recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, BOP, Civil Rights Division, DOJ, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, FBI, OIG, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at GoodwinG@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII.

Gretta L. Goodwin
Director, Homeland Security and Justice

This report examines: (1) the extent to which the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has established and communicated policies and procedures on employee misconduct, (2) the extent to which BOP has incorporated data analysis, strategic planning, and evaluation mechanisms into its management of employee misconduct; and (3) the roles and responsibilities of other Department of Justice (DOJ) components in investigating and prosecuting BOP employee misconduct.

To inform our understanding of the nature and scope of BOP employee misconduct cases, and to provide baseline information across all three objectives, we searched relevant literature. This included reports and articles from government bodies, news media, nonprofit organizations, and other sources. We sought information on (1) BOP employee misconduct incidents in general and (2) specific BOP facilities with widespread misconduct issues.

For all three of our objectives, we interviewed BOP officials at the headquarters and regional level to discuss efforts to prevent and address employee misconduct.

·         Office of Internal Affairs (OIA). We discussed policies and procedures for investigating employee misconduct, recent changes to OIA’s structure and staffing, efforts to reduce the backlog of cases, coordination with the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the collection, management, and use of data. Additionally, we interviewed supervisory investigators aligned to OIA and located at BOP’s six regional offices (discussed below) to learn more about their roles and experiences.

·         Office of General Counsel. We met with officials from this unit’s Office of Ethics regarding their process for updating the BOP Standards of Employee Conduct and related training. Additionally, we met with officials from the Employment Law Branch on their policies and procedures for reviewing employee discipline letters, their role in an initiative to streamline the review process for discipline letters that meet certain criteria, and recent changes to the branch’s structure and staffing.

·         Human Resources Management Division. We discussed the delivery and evaluation of training on the Standards of Employee Conduct, as well as the division’s role in the discipline review initiative, discussed above.

·         Program Review Division. We discussed the program reviews conducted on Human Resources offices at BOP facilities, including the methodology used to select and audit facilities for these reviews and recent changes to policies and procedures.

·         Information Technology and Data Division. We discussed the capabilities of Case File Manager, the system that stores BOP employee misconduct allegations and investigations.

·         Regional offices. We met with leadership and Human Resources officials from BOP’s six regional offices about efforts to prevent employee misconduct at facilities in their regions, policies and procedures for reviewing discipline letters, and guidance BOP headquarters provides them.

Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Council of Prison Locals C-33, the union that represents bargaining unit BOP employees at the national level. We discussed their perspectives on the employee disciplinary process and the union’s negotiations with BOP management on revising the new Standards of Employee Conduct policy issued in June 2024.[82]

Further, we visited a nongeneralizable sample of three BOP Federal Correctional Complexes to learn more about facilities’ experiences: Yazoo City in Mississippi, Hazelton in West Virginia, and Victorville in California. We selected these facilities by (1) identifying known employee misconduct issues as indicated by BOP data and publicly available reports, (2) seeking variety in security level, geographic location, and gender of the incarcerated population, and (3) prioritizing facilities with an onsite OIA investigator.[83] We identified these criteria to gather perspectives on facilities’ approaches and challenges to addressing employee misconduct.

At each facility, we observed the signs posted in housing units and other locations to communicate employee misconduct reporting options to incarcerated individuals. We also interviewed facility officials about efforts to prevent, investigate, and discipline employee misconduct, including wardens and other leadership, OIA investigators assigned to the complex, human resources, health services, psychology services, and religious services. Additionally, we interviewed local union presidents at each location.

Further, we interviewed a total of 13 correctional officers and 12 incarcerated individuals at these facilities. While the information we gathered during these interviews provided valuable insights, these interviews are not representative of all BOP correctional officers or all incarcerated individuals across BOP.

·         Correctional officers. We sought perspectives on the employee disciplinary process, training, and other topics. We selected four officers at each complex using rosters of the officers who were available during our visits, which included the dates on which those officers were hired at BOP. For each complex, we selected two experienced officers (hired in or before 2015) and two newer officers (hired in or after 2021) to obtain a variety of perspectives.

·         Incarcerated individuals. We sought to understand their knowledge of employee misconduct reporting mechanisms, their experiences with employees, and other topics. At the Hazelton and Victorville complexes, we randomly selected two men and two women from different housing units using rosters. Because the Yazoo City complex does not include a women’s facility, we randomly selected four incarcerated men from different housing units.[84]

To determine the extent to which BOP has established and communicated employee misconduct policies, we reviewed BOP’s Standards of Employee Conduct to identify the number of offense types and assess changes between the prior version (last updated in 2013) and the revised policy published in June 2024. We also reviewed signs and orientation handbooks from the three BOP facilities we visited. Additionally, we obtained information from BOP units responsible for developing guidance about the minimum content these handbooks and signage are to include. We compared the information in those materials to the number of offense types listed in the Standards of Employee Conduct to determine whether BOP provided information to the incarcerated population about reporting employee misconduct, beyond sexual misconduct.

Further, we identified offense types that constitute criminal misconduct but are not described in the standardized admissions and orientation handbook language on reporting sexual misconduct. Specifically, we analyzed the 73 misconduct offenses in the Standards of Employee Conduct and identified the offenses that (1) would be considered Category 1 offenses, (2) could affect incarcerated individuals’ health and safety, and (3) are reasonably identifiable by incarcerated individuals. We focused on Category 1 offenses, and categorized them using the OIA’s staff manual, which provides guidance on how to categorize each misconduct allegation.[85] We assessed BOP’s efforts to communicate information about employee misconduct to incarcerated individuals against our prior work on key practices for establishing a communication strategy to build trust, ensure consistency of message, encourage two-way communication, and provide information to meet specific needs of employees and stakeholders.[86]

Further, we assessed relevant BOP policy on reporting, investigating, and disciplining employee misconduct, including the program statement that establishes BOP OIA’s processes for investigative interviews. We assessed BOP’s policy on conducting investigative interviews against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which state that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives, which includes obtaining relevant data from reliable internal and external sources.[87]

Lastly, we interviewed BOP officials about their methodology for collecting, evaluating, and using feedback from employees who completed BOP’s training on the Standards of Employee Conduct. We assessed BOP’s efforts to evaluate Standards of Employee Conduct training against leading practices for assessing strategic training in the federal government, which state that agencies should evaluate and assess the extent to which training contributes to improved performance and results.

To determine the extent to which the bureau used data in its management of employee misconduct, we analyzed data from BOP OIA’s Case File Manager system on employee and contractor misconduct allegations received from October 2013 through February 2025. We selected this period to identify changes over the past 10 complete fiscal years and to obtain the most current information. Among other things, we examined allegations by volume, offense type, and facility. We also calculated the processing times for cases received and closed during that period and identified the number of cases that remained open when BOP retrieved the data from its system.

To assess the reliability of these data, we (1) reviewed the user manual for the Case File Manager data system; (2) interviewed and obtained written responses from BOP officials about their management of the data; and (3) conducted electronic tests to identify any missing, duplicate, and erroneous data. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of analyzing BOP’s employee misconduct workload from October 2013 through February 2025.

Further, we reviewed the policy that establishes OIA’s roles and responsibilities and OIA’s annual reports on the misconduct workload from fiscal years 2014 through 2023, which was the year with the most recent available report at the time of our audit. We assessed BOP’s efforts to analyze employee misconduct data against its strategic goal and objectives to review and analyze data to inform evidence-based decisions that will be used to improve agency operations, policies, and procedures across all disciplines.[88] We also used as criteria the Program Statement that establishes OIA’s responsibilities and includes among them maintaining a database to provide information about trends and ensure accountability.[89] Additionally, we evaluated these efforts against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which state that management should use quality information to achieve key objectives, including by processing data.

Moreover, we evaluated BOP’s efforts to reduce the pending employee misconduct caseload by interviewing officials regarding those efforts, including the increase and realignment of staff and the strike team and discipline review initiatives. We assessed those efforts against sound planning practices identified in prior work, which found that in order to achieve desired results and ensure accountability, organizations should develop plans that (1) identify necessary activities, resources, and milestones and (2) designate roles, responsibilities, and coordination within the organization.[90] We also evaluated those efforts against the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which state that management should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate the agency’s performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks.[91]

Further, we assessed BOP’s efforts to evaluate the timeliness of employee misconduct cases by interviewing officials about those efforts and reviewing policies that establish roles and responsibilities in the employee disciplinary process. We also examined discipline logs maintained by the three BOP facilities we selected to understand the information tracked in those logs. We assessed BOP’s efforts to evaluate timeliness against the Project Management Institute’s Standard for Program Management, which states that meaningful measures can help management determine whether outcomes are delivered in a timely manner and, if necessary, propose changes to the program.[92]

To describe the roles and responsibilities of DOJ components in investigating and prosecuting BOP employee misconduct, we analyzed data from OIG’s Investigations Data Management System on BOP employee and contractor misconduct allegations received from October 2013 through March 2025. We selected this period to identify changes over the past 10 complete fiscal years and to obtain the most current information. Specifically, we reviewed the volume and source of allegations OIG received, the number and offense type of allegations OIG accepted for investigation, the extent to which OIG conducted investigations jointly with other agencies, and the number and outcome of investigations referred for criminal prosecution. We also calculated the timeliness of OIG’s review of allegations by calculating the number of days between the date OIG received the allegation and the date OIG determined how to handle that allegation.

To assess the reliability of these data, we (1) reviewed system documentation, (2) interviewed and obtained written responses from OIG officials about their management of the data, and (3) conducted electronic tests to identify any missing, duplicate, and erroneous data. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing OIG’s BOP employee misconduct workload from October 2013 through March 2025.

Further, we interviewed officials in all DOJ components with roles and responsibilities in investigating and prosecuting BOP employee misconduct, based on our assessment of components’ duties. Specifically, we interviewed officials in the Civil Rights Division, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, and OIG. We also interviewed officials from three U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in judicial districts that corresponded to the BOP facilities we visited—the Central District of California, Northern District of West Virginia, and Southern District of Mississippi. We interviewed these officials to gather perspectives about the volume and type of BOP employee misconduct cases their districts have historically prosecuted.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2024 to September 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Table 7 provides an overview of the Kalkines v. United States and Garrity v. New Jersey cases that inform federal employees’ rights during interviews as part of administrative investigations. The table includes background on the case, the court rulings (or holdings), and their basis for Kalkines warnings and Garrity warnings.

Court Case	Background of Case and Holding
Kalkines v. United Statesa	The Bureau of Customs began an investigation based on information that a public employee accepted payment from an importer’s representative in return for favorable treatment on the valuation of a customs entry. During the agency investigation, for all or most of the time, a criminal investigation was also being conducted as to possible bribery charges against the employee. The employee was summoned by customs agents on several occasions but refused to answer certain questions relating to the employee’s bank deposit, finances, and some aspects of the performance of the employee’s customs duties which resulted in the employee’s suspension and dismissal. The court found that the employee was not provided any advice or warnings as to the employee’s constitutional rights, though the employee was informed of the requirement to respond to questions based upon the Customs Manual. According to the court, this left the employee with the dilemma of either answering the questions and being subject to the possibility of self-incrimination, or of avoiding giving such help to the prosecution at the cost of the employee’s livelihood. The court held that an individual cannot be discharged because the employee invokes the employee’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to respond. A later prosecution cannot constitutionally use statements, or their fruits, coerced from the employee, in an earlier disciplinary investigation or proceeding, by a threat of removal from office if the employee fails to answer the question. However, a governmental employer is not wholly barred from insisting that relevant information be given to it. The public employee may be removed for not replying if the employee is adequately informed both that the employee is subject to discharge for not answering and that the employee’s responses, and the fruits of those responses, cannot be employed against the employee in a criminal case, which generally, is the basis for the Kalkines warning.
Garrity v. New Jerseyb	Police officers were investigated by the State regarding allegations of fixing traffic tickets. Each officer was warned before questioning that what was said could be used against the officer in a state criminal proceeding; the officer could refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate the officer; and if the officer refused to answer the officer would be subject to removal from office pursuant to state statute. The police officers answered the questions, and their responses were used to convict the officers on criminal charges. According to the Court, the officers’ answers to the questions were used over their objections in subsequent prosecutions, which resulted in their convictions. The Court reversed the defendants’ convictions on the grounds that their statements were coerced, finding that the State could not threaten to discharge officers in order to obtain incriminating evidence against them. The Court ruled that everyone was afforded the protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and any incriminating statements obtained under the State forfeiture-of-office statute were barred from use in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Generally, a Garrity warning indicates that the individual is engaging in a voluntary interview, the individual does not have to answer questions if the individual believes it could implicate the individual in a crime, and disciplinary action will not be taken for solely refusing to answer questions. However, the evidentiary value of the individual’s silence may be considered and any statement chosen to be made by the individual may be used as evidence in criminal and administrative proceedings.

Sources: GAO analysis of court decisions. | GAO‑25‑107339

^aKalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391 (1973).

^bGarrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).

This appendix provides information from Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy documents that establish the process for conducting investigative interviews as part of employee misconduct cases (see figs. 12 and 13).

Table 8 provides illustrative examples from our interviews with 12 incarcerated individuals at Federal Correctional Complexes Yazoo City, Hazelton, and Victorville. While the anecdotal information we learned during these interviews provided valuable insights about individuals’ experiences, these interviews are not representative of the entire incarcerated population across the Bureau of Prisons. We did not independently verify the veracity of the incarcerated individuals’ statements from our interviews. In accordance with our policy, we referred information related to the statements made during these interviews to the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, as appropriate.

Topic	Interviewee responses
Incidents of misconduct witnessed or experienced	Six individuals described witnessing or experiencing employee misconduct. For example, some described experiencing verbal or sexual harassment or witnessing physical abuse from employees.a
Discomfort with reporting employee misconduct	Seven individuals said they had concerns that incarcerated individuals could be punished for reporting employee misconduct. ·          For example, some expressed concerns that employees might search their cells or place them in a Special Housing Unit.b ·          Additionally, some interviewees had concerns that their facility’s Special Investigative Agent phone line is monitored and could expose them to retaliation.c ·          The Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General hotline can keep reports of employee misconduct confidential from BOP, according to officials. However, some interviewees expressed doubt that this mechanism was truly confidential.
Lack of confidence in employee misconduct investigations	Four individuals said they did not feel confident that BOP would investigate employee misconduct in a timely manner. Additionally, four individuals said they did not feel confident that BOP would hold employees accountable for their actions, and another four said that accountability is inconsistent. ·          Some said they would not risk reporting because it would have no impact. ·          Two individuals said they had seen BOP transfer problematic employees to other units or facilities rather than disciplining them.

Source: GAO analysis. | GAO‑25‑107339

Note: We interviewed incarcerated individuals at Federal Correctional Complexes Yazoo City, Hazelton, and Victorville. While the anecdotal information we learned during these interviews provided valuable insights about individuals’ experiences, these interviews are not representative of the entire incarcerated population across BOP.

^aWe did not independently verify the veracity of the statements referenced. We referred allegations of potential physical abuse and other employee misconduct allegations to the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General for further action, as appropriate.

^bBOP uses Special Housing Units to house individuals for a variety of administrative purposes and for disciplinary purposes related to prohibited acts. GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Restrictive Housing Practices, GAO‑24‑105737 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2024).

^cSpecial Investigative Agents investigate employee misconduct at BOP facilities and report to the Office of Internal Affairs. Incarcerated individuals can call their phone line to report employee misconduct.

This appendix provides additional information on the outcomes of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee misconduct cases that were reported from October 2013 through February 2025 and closed during that period, as shown in figure 15. According to our analysis of BOP data, BOP completed the investigations for 44,956 allegations of employee misconduct during this period. BOP sustained a total 17,927 of those cases (approximately 40 percent)—that is, the investigation found sufficient evidence to uphold at least one alleged offense.

Note: This figure includes cases that were reported from October 2013 through February 2025 and closed during that period. As such, cases reported prior to October 2013 are not included, and we excluded 12 cases that were missing an outcome in BOP’s data. While BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs investigates most cases, a small number are investigated by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General or another body, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. According to officials, BOP receives reports on the outcomes of cases other agencies investigate and is ultimately responsible for disciplining its employees, when applicable.

^aAccording to BOP documentation, an allegation is sustained if it is supported by admission or a “preponderance of evidence.” A “preponderance of evidence” is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).

^bAn allegation is not sustained if there is insufficient evidence to support the allegation and there is no additional contrary evidence to refute the allegation and the allegation cannot otherwise be reasonably dismissed as without merit or substance. An allegation is unfounded if the evidence refutes the allegation or the allegation can be reasonably dismissed as without merit or substance.

^cBOP administratively closes a case when the investigation cannot be completed, such as when the employee under investigation has resigned, retired, or died.

GAO Contact

Gretta L. Goodwin, goodwing@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Joy A. Booth (Assistant Director), James Lawson (Analyst-in-Charge), Howard Arp, Lauri Barnes, Billy Commons, Elizabeth Dretsch, Eric Hauswirth, Shirley Hwang, Alison Knowles, Brian Pegram, and John Tamariz made key contributions to this report.

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