PERSONNEL VETTING

Leadership Attention Needed to Prioritize System Development and Achieve Reforms

Statement of Alissa H. Czyz, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. ET

Tuesday, February 24, 2026

GAO-26-108838

United States Government Accountability Office

A testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Operations,

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

For more information, contact Alissa H. Czyz at czyza@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

Since 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been developing the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS)—an IT system for conducting background investigations for most federal agencies and over 13,000 industry organizations that work with the government. DOD originally expected NBIS to be complete in 2019, but repeated delays have hindered deployment. GAO has also found that the previous NBIS cost estimate and schedules were unreliable. After missing multiple targets, DOD’s Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) paused NBIS development in 2024 to revise its approach. In 2025, it developed a new cost estimate and changed its approach to scheduling.

GAO reviewed DCSA’s 2025 NBIS cost estimate and found it to be reliable because it at least substantially met four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. DOD now projects spending an additional $2.2 billion on NBIS development through fiscal year 2031, which is in addition to $2.4 billion previously spent on NBIS and legacy systems through fiscal year 2024. A reliable cost estimate should help prevent unexpected cost overruns and provide needed visibility.

GAO also found that DCSA continues to lack a reliable schedule for NBIS. The program’s schedule showed improvements, substantially meeting two characteristics of a reliable schedule. However, it only partially met the credible and well-constructed characteristics. For example, a risk analysis can help the program prioritize those risks that may lead to delays. Not having a reliable schedule is likely to continue to affect the NBIS program’s ability to meet milestones, including the goal to complete development in fiscal year 2027.

Continued prioritization of NBIS development will be critical to successfully implement government-wide personnel vetting reforms and address persistent challenges. For example, GAO has found federal agencies have not met timeliness goals for nearly all phases of the security clearance process. In particular, average times for initial Top Secret clearances have consistently trended longer from fiscal year 2022 to 2025. Sustained leadership attention is key to fully deploying the NBIS system and achieving personnel vetting reform.

Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. government personnel vetting processes, such as background investigations, rely on IT systems to process data on millions of federal employees and contractor personnel. DOD has been developing NBIS as the new IT system for personnel vetting since 2016. In 2018, the government initiated a major reform of personnel vetting to better protect national security called Trusted Workforce 2.0. GAO placed the personnel vetting process on its High-Risk List in the same year.

This statement discusses (1) the reliability of DCSA’s 2025 cost estimate for the NBIS program, (2) the extent to which the NBIS program has met scheduling best practices, and (3) the importance of NBIS to achieve personnel vetting reforms under Trusted Workforce 2.0.

This statement is based on GAO’s analysis of DCSA’s 2025 cost estimate and schedule, prior GAO reports on NBIS from December 2021 through September 2025, and ongoing work assessing NBIS development. To perform prior and ongoing work, GAO analyzed information on NBIS from DCSA and interviewed knowledgeable officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making two recommendations to DOD to ensure it aligns its NBIS schedule with best practices. DOD provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. 

In prior reports, GAO made one matter for congressional consideration to require DCSA to develop a reliable schedule and cost estimate for NBIS and recommendations to DOD to improve NBIS cybersecurity. GAO will continue to monitor this high-risk area.

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD) development of the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS). NBIS is an IT system intended for use in conducting background investigations for most federal agencies and over 13,000 industry organizations that work with the government.

Personnel vetting processes–including background investigations–and the IT systems that support them are vital to determining the trustworthiness of the federal government’s workforce and minimizing risks to U.S. national security. In 2015, two cybersecurity incidents compromised sensitive information in Office of Personnel Management (OPM) systems, including personnel vetting files on over 22 million federal employees and contractor personnel. A year later, the President assigned DOD the responsibility for developing and operating IT systems for personnel vetting processes, and DOD began developing NBIS in 2016.[1] DOD has been developing NBIS for almost a decade.

Today, DOD’s Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is responsible for developing and securing the NBIS system for personnel vetting while also maintaining legacy IT systems.[2] Additionally, DCSA provides personnel vetting services for most of the government, including conducting around 2 million background investigations each year.[3] However, in early 2024, DCSA paused the NBIS program after it missed multiple milestones for Trusted Workforce 2.0—the government’s major reform of personnel vetting.[4] During the pause, DCSA changed its approach to NBIS, including revising its schedule to meet future milestones and developing a new cost estimate.

We have previously assessed two of DCSA’s key management tools for developing NBIS—its schedule and cost estimate—and found neither was reliable. In 2021 and 2023, we assessed two versions of DCSA’s schedule, and in 2023, we also assessed DCSA’s cost estimate against our best practices and found these tools were deficient.[5] To address deficiencies in both management tools, we have an open recommendation to Congress to consider requiring DOD to develop a schedule and cost estimate that align with our best practices.

You asked us to review DCSA’s continued development of NBIS. This statement provides information on (1) the reliability of DCSA’s 2025 cost estimate for the NBIS program, (2) the extent to which the NBIS program has met scheduling best practices, and (3) the importance of NBIS to achieve personnel vetting reforms under Trusted Workforce 2.0.

This statement is based in part on our prior reports and testimonies reviewing NBIS from December 2021 through September 2025.[6] This body of work also informed our 2025 update on the government-wide personnel security clearance process––an issue on our High-Risk List.[7] More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for our prior work can be found in the issued reports listed in the Related GAO Products section at the end of this statement.

This statement is also based on our recent work assessing NBIS development. To perform this work, we analyzed information on NBIS from DCSA, including documentation on the status of NBIS system development and the program’s cost estimate and schedule. To assess the NBIS program cost estimate, we obtained the April 2025 estimate and compared it against our best practices for cost estimating.[8] To assess NBIS program scheduling, we analyzed data from DCSA’s Agile software tool from June through September of 2025 and compared these against our best practices for project schedules.[9] We also interviewed officials with knowledge of the NBIS program and legacy personnel vetting systems. More detailed information on our analysis of the NBIS cost estimate and schedule can be found in appendix I and appendix II, respectively.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2025 to February 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

The Personnel Vetting Process and Trusted Workforce 2.0

Personnel vetting processes help ensure the trustworthiness of the federal government’s workforce and those who support it by determining whether individuals are, and remain over time, (1) eligible to access classified information or to hold a sensitive position; (2) suitable for government employment or fit to perform work for, or on behalf of, the government as contractor employees or certain categories of federal employees; and (3) eligible for access to agency systems or facilities. The Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council (PAC) is responsible for the government-wide implementation of personnel vetting reforms and helps set NBIS requirements.[10] In March 2018, the PAC’s principal members initiated Trusted Workforce 2.0 to reform the personnel vetting processes. The PAC aims to achieve multiple goals with the reform including reducing the time required to bring new hires on board.

NBIS Development Delays and Cost

Following the 2015 OPM cybersecurity incidents, DOD directed the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to lead the acquisition of a new IT system to replace all OPM legacy IT systems supporting background investigation processes. DOD initially planned for NBIS to be fully operational in 2019, but it did not meet this target. DCSA then took over responsibility for NBIS and legacy systems from DISA in October 2020, as DCSA had assumed responsibility for conducting background investigations for most federal agencies. It projected that it would deliver all initial NBIS capabilities by the end of fiscal year 2023 and decommission all legacy IT systems by the end of fiscal year 2024.

However, DOD missed those targets and in early 2024 paused the NBIS program and undertook a replanning effort to change its approach to develop and manage the NBIS system. Figure 1 shows a timeline of NBIS delays in development since 2016. From fiscal years 2017 through 2024, DOD spent $2.4 billion on developing NBIS and sustaining legacy personnel vetting systems.[11]

NBIS Replanning and Development

After pausing development in early 2024, DOD revised its approach to the NBIS program, focusing on modernizing legacy systems rather than building an entirely new IT infrastructure. First, as part of its efforts to address NBIS delays, cost overruns, and technical issues, DOD transferred milestone decision authority for the NBIS program from DCSA to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.[12] Then, it established the NBIS Requirements Governance Board in October 2024 to manage requirements prioritization and inform decision-making.

As of February 2026, DOD is migrating personnel vetting data to cloud-based infrastructure and modernizing the programming code of legacy systems. DOD projects to complete system modernization by the end of fiscal year 2027 and decommission legacy IT infrastructure in fiscal year 2028.

DOD Developed a Reliable Cost Estimate for the NBIS Program

We found that the NBIS program’s 2025 cost estimate is reliable. The estimate projects $2.2 billion in costs for the NBIS program from fiscal year 2025 through fiscal year 2031, which is in addition to the $2.4 billion spent on NBIS and legacy systems through fiscal year 2024. The estimate includes the costs of migrating personnel vetting data to the cloud-based infrastructure, modernizing the code of legacy systems, and sustaining personnel vetting systems through fiscal year 2031.

We assessed the 2025 estimate against best practices for developing and maintaining reliable cost estimates as defined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.[13] The Guide organizes these best practices into four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate: accurate, comprehensive, credible, and well-documented.

We determined that the NBIS cost estimate met two characteristics of a reliable cost estimate and substantially met the remaining two characteristics.[14] A cost estimate is considered reliable if the assessment for each of the four characteristics is met or substantially met. For example, DOD conducted an independent cost estimate of the NBIS program to validate DCSA’s estimate, which is consistent with our guidance on the credibility characteristic.[15] In addition, NBIS officials stated they plan to monitor programmatic, technical, and schedule changes that affect the cost estimate and update the estimate annually to reflect those changes as required by DOD acquisition guidance.[16] Regularly updating the estimate is consistent with the accurate characteristic.

NBIS program management can now rely on the 2025 NBIS program cost estimate to help reduce the risk of future cost overruns and accurately present program performance. Figure 2 shows how DCSA improved the quality of its cost estimate since our 2023 assessment.[17] We provide a table with our full assessment of the 2025 cost estimate in appendix I.

Note: We assessed the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency’s cost estimate from 2023 and 2025 for the NBIS program against best practices for cost estimating published in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. In our guide, we state that a high-quality cost estimate has four characteristics: it is accurate, comprehensive, credible, and well-documented. See GAO‑20‑195G.

DOD Has Made Improvements but Has Still Not Fully Met Scheduling Best Practices for NBIS

We found that the NBIS schedule does not meet all best practices for a reliable schedule. Figure 3 below shows the extent to which DCSA has met scheduling best practices since our 2021 and 2023 assessments.[18] Our full assessment can be found in appendix II.

Note: We assessed the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency’s schedule for the NBIS program from 2021, 2023, and 2025 against scheduling best practices published in our GAO Schedule Assessment Guide and also described in our Agile Assessment Guide. In our guide, we state that a high-quality, reliable schedule has four characteristics: it is comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled. See GAO‑16‑89G and GAO‑24‑105506.

DCSA is using an Agile software tool to manage the NBIS program schedule. Previously, DCSA maintained both an integrated master schedule and an Agile software tool to track system development work, but it no longer maintains the former.[19] We assessed its use of this tool against best practices for developing a reliable schedule as defined in our Schedule Assessment Guide and Agile Assessment Guide. The Guides organize these best practices into four characteristics of sound schedule estimating: comprehensive, controlled, credible, and well-constructed. All best practices need to be at least substantially met for a schedule to be considered reliable.

We determined that DCSA substantially met the comprehensive and controlled characteristics for the NBIS program schedule. For example, data we reviewed from the program’s Agile software tool are comprehensive because the program defined the work it needs to complete to accomplish its objectives. The program also substantially meets the controlled characteristic because key status information is documented and reviewed regularly, including milestone progress and changes to delivery timelines.

However, DCSA does not meet all of the characteristics of a reliable schedule because it has only partially met the well-constructed and credible characteristics. For example, it has not yet identified a critical path for the NBIS program that could focus management’s attention on the activities whose delay will adversely impact the schedule completion date, a characteristic of a well-constructed schedule.[20] The program has also not conducted a schedule risk analysis. A schedule risk analysis improves the credibility of scheduled dates and prioritizes risks that may lead to delays.

In February 2026, NBIS program officials stated in their response to our analysis of deficiencies that they have a fundamentally different approach to managing their work using Agile. Officials stated that their Agile software tool allows activities to be linked, but that the program does not define or manage a critical path as that, in their view, would misrepresent and constrain the program’s work. However, a valid critical path can provide management with reliable timeline estimates and help identify problems.

Moreover, NBIS program officials said that they discuss cost and schedule impacts of short-term work on a regular basis, but have not done a schedule risk analysis for the whole program because they believe their Agile approach is more effective. This approach, however, does not include a quantitative assessment to determine risk—a best practice. This stated approach also contrasts with the program’s April 2025 action plan, which committed to meeting all characteristics of a reliable schedule with the software tool. Our analysis shows that the program’s actions have not yet met the intent of all of our best practices.

The NBIS program’s long-term goal is to complete NBIS system development by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, as noted in our previous assessments, Agile software programs that do not meet scheduling best practices can face delays in system deployment, and the program has a history of repeated delays in meeting milestones. Improving NBIS scheduling practices so that DCSA meets or substantially meets all characteristics of a reliable schedule could decrease the risk that DCSA will continue to have delays in delivering NBIS capabilities to achieve Trusted Workforce 2.0 milestones.

NBIS Is Critical to Advancing Trusted Workforce 2.0 Reforms

Since I last testified on NBIS before this subcommittee in 2024, DOD has taken positive steps to prioritize NBIS development. It is important that DOD continue this trajectory of progress to provide modernized personnel vetting systems to implement Trusted Workforce 2.0. When the PAC initiated the reform effort in 2018, it planned to be finished by the end of fiscal year 2026. However, due to NBIS development delays and other factors, the PAC has pushed that milestone to the end of fiscal year 2028.[21] For example, our analysis of NBIS-related milestones in the January 2026 update to the Trusted Workforce 2.0 Implementation Strategy shows these delays continue—at least 46 percent of these milestones have been pushed out since April 2025.

Meanwhile, challenges that the reform was meant to address persist. In particular, the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process has been a long-standing challenge, and the PAC identifies NBIS as critical to address it. For example, the PAC envisions that NBIS will enable automated electronic adjudication of low-risk cases, allowing adjudicators to focus on more complex cases. In 2018, performance gaps as a result of agencies not meeting timeliness goals prompted us to place the security clearance process on our High-Risk List and led the PAC to initiate Trusted Workforce 2.0. However, performance continues to lag. Agencies have not consistently met goals for nearly all phases of the process for Secret or Top Secret clearances. For example, figure 4 shows that

·       As of the second quarter of fiscal year 2025, agencies took an average of 206 days to complete the fastest 90 percent of initial Top Secret clearances—92 days beyond the 114-day goal.[22]

·       Average times for initial Top Secret clearances have trended longer from fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2025.

Moreover, agencies have not met timeliness goals for the investigative phase for initial Secret and Top Secret clearances since 2021. To address these persistent delays, DOD and PAC leadership must continue to prioritize NBIS development to ensure full implementation of Trusted Workforce 2.0 and its goal for a timely vetting process.

A fully deployed NBIS system is also critical to implementing continuous vetting of individuals—another key aspect of Trusted Workforce 2.0. Continuous vetting is an approach that consists of enrolling cleared personnel in IT systems that conduct ongoing automated record checks of various data sources used for ensuring, among other things, their ongoing eligibility/access to classified information. Currently, the PAC is enrolling personnel in legacy continuous vetting IT systems while DCSA develops NBIS. However, as we reported in May 2025, continuing to rely on legacy systems that have not been modernized may cause challenges for agencies. In particular, a third of the agencies we surveyed for our May 2025 report stated that NBIS delays had disrupted the implementation of continuous vetting.[23]

The urgency of developing NBIS is heightened by the increasing number of personnel enrolled in legacy continuous vetting systems and a growing number of alerts. PAC quarterly reporting shows that the volume of continuous vetting alerts requiring review has risen from approximately 30,000 per quarter in fiscal year 2023 to over 100,000 in the third quarter of fiscal year 2025. It will be important for DCSA leadership to continue their progress in developing NBIS to provide agencies with modern tools to process the growing number of alerts that continuous vetting systems generate.[24]

Conclusions

Over the past 2 years, DCSA leadership has focused on improving its approach to NBIS. Having a reliable cost estimate for the program is a significant step forward. However, weaknesses in DCSA’s approach to scheduling may continue to jeopardize its ability to meet milestones. The NBIS program has a long history of repeated milestone delays that continue today, with the PAC pushing out nearly half of the NBIS-related milestones in its most recent Trusted Workforce 2.0 strategy. By ensuring that the NBIS program’s schedule aligns with all best practice characteristics defined in our guides—particularly for the schedule practices to be well-constructed and credible—DCSA will decrease the risk of continued delays in delivering NBIS capabilities.

Going forward, DOD must continue to prioritize developing NBIS capabilities to help ensure the success of Trusted Workforce 2.0. We will continue to monitor DOD’s progress in implementing our recommendations in this area.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making the following two recommendations to DOD:

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency aligns DCSA’s schedule for the National Background Investigation Services program with the “well-constructed” characteristic as defined in GAO’s guides for scheduling and Agile software development by addressing those scheduling best practices that were partially met, including establishing a valid critical path. (Recommendation 1)

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency aligns DCSA’s schedule for the National Background Investigation Services program with the “credible” characteristic as defined in GAO’s guides for scheduling and Agile software development by addressing those scheduling best practices that were partially or minimally met, including conducting a schedule risk analysis. (Recommendation 2)

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this statement to DOD for review and comment. DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the statement as appropriate.

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Alissa H. Czyz, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at czyza@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are James P. Klein and Kimberly Seay (Assistant Directors), Parke Nicholson (Analyst in Charge), Dustin Cohan, Victoria Coxon, Emile Ettedgui, Christopher Gezon, Susannah Hawthorne, Jason Lee, Susan Elizabeth Murphy, Alice Paszel, Terry Richardson, Carter Stevens, Daniel Swartz, Anne Thomas, Mary Weiland, and Erik Wilkins-McKee.

We found that the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) program’s 2025 cost estimate is reliable. As shown in table 1, it met two characteristics of a reliable cost estimate—well-documented and credible—and substantially met the remaining two—comprehensive and accurate. A cost estimate is considered reliable if the assessment for each of the four characteristics is at least substantially met. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate and cannot be considered reliable.

To assess the NBIS program’s most recent cost estimate, we reviewed Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) documentation on the status of the NBIS system development, analyzed DCSA schedule and cost estimate documentation, and met with NBIS program officials to discuss cost estimating. We obtained the April 2025 NBIS program office estimate and compared the estimate against our best practices for cost estimating.[25] In December 2025, we provided DCSA a draft of our analysis for its review. DCSA officials said they did not have concerns with our analysis and did not otherwise provide comments.

Best practice characteristic and overall assessment	Best practice
Comprehensive: Substantially met	Includes all life cycle costs.
	Based on a technical baseline description that completely defines the program, reflects the current schedule, and is technically reasonable.
	Based on a work breakdown structure (WBS) that is product-oriented, traceable to the statement of work, and at an appropriate level of detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double-counted.
	Documents all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions.
Well-documented: Met	Documentation shows the source data used, the reliability of the data, and the estimating methodology used to derive each element’s cost.
	Documentation describes how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst unfamiliar with the program could understand what was done and replicate it.
	Documentation discusses the technical baseline description and the data in the technical baseline are consistent with the cost estimate.
	Documentation provides evidence that was reviewed and accepted by management.
Accurate: Substantially met	Based on a model developed by estimating each work breakdown structure element using the best methodology from the data collected.
	Adjusted properly for inflation.
	Contains few, if any, minor mistakes.
	Based on a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences from other comparable programs.
Credible: Met	Includes a sensitivity analysis that identifies a range of possible costs based on varying major assumptions, parameters, and data inputs.
	Includes a risk and uncertainty analysis that quantifies the imperfectly understood risks and identifies the effects of changing key cost driver assumptions and factors.
	Employs cross-checks—or alternate methodologies—on major cost elements to validate results.
	Compared to an independent cost estimate that is conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization to determine whether other estimating methods produce similar results.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense information. | GAO‑26‑108838

Note: We assessed the DCSA 2025 cost estimate for the NBIS program against best practices for cost estimating published in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. In our guide, we state that a high-quality cost estimate has four characteristics: it is accurate, comprehensive, credible, and well-documented. “Met” means the program provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion. “Substantially met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. “Partially met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. “Minimally met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. “Not met” means the program did not provide evidence that satisfies the criterion.

We found that the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) program’s schedule includes some, but not all characteristics of a reliable schedule. As shown in table 2, the schedule partially met two characteristics—well-constructed and credible—and substantially met the remaining two—comprehensive and controlled. A schedule is considered reliable if the assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially or fully met. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the schedule does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality schedule and cannot be considered reliable.

To assess NBIS program scheduling, we reviewed Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) documentation on the status of the NBIS system development, analyzed data from DCSA’s Agile software tool from June through September 2025, and met with NBIS program officials to discuss scheduling. We compared the information we collected in our assessment against GAO best practices for project schedules.[26] We then provided our draft analysis to DCSA officials for comment in January 2026 and discussed our analysis with NBIS program officials in February 2026.

Best practice characteristic, overall assessment, and description	Best practice
Comprehensive: Substantially met The program’s Agile software tool generally captures all activities and includes resource allocation and activity durations.	Capturing all activities
	Assigning all resources to activities
	Establishing the durations of all activities
Well-constructed: Partially met Program activities are not sufficiently linked to enable sequencing and identification of a critical path that, if delayed, would impact key milestones.	Sequencing all activities
	Confirming that the critical path is valid
	Ensuring reasonable total float
Credible: Partially met Schedule data lacks sufficient links to enable tracing between program elements and end products. A schedule risk analysis has not been conducted to determine the confidence level in achieving the program schedule.	Verifying that the schedule can be traced horizontally and vertically
	Conducting a schedule risk analysis
Controlled: Substantially met Key program status information is generally monitored, and baseline dates are tracked in the software tool.	Updating the schedule using actual progress and logic
	Maintaining a baseline schedule

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense information. | GAO‑26‑108838

Note: We assessed DCSA’s scheduling practices for the NBIS program against best practices for a reliable schedule published in our GAO Schedule Assessment Guide and also described in our Agile Assessment Guide. See GAO‑16‑89G and GAO‑24‑105506. In our guides, we state that a high-quality, reliable schedule has four characteristics: it is comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled. “Met” means the program provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion. “Substantially met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. “Partially met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. “Minimally met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. “Not met” means the program did not provide evidence that satisfies the criterion.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Actions Needed to Address Cybersecurity of Background Investigation Systems. GAO‑26‑107027SU. Washington, D.C.: Dec 18, 2025.

Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Address Significant Data Reliability Issues That Impact Oversight. GAO‑26‑107100. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2025.

Personnel Vetting: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to DOD’s New Approach to Its Background Investigation System. GAO‑25‑108721. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2025.

Federal Workforce: Observations on the Implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 Personnel Vetting Reform Initiative. GAO‑25‑107325. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2025.

High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness. GAO‑25‑107743. Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2025.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Needs to Improve Management of the National Background Investigation Services Program. GAO‑24‑107616. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2024.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Needs to Enhance Cybersecurity of Background Investigation Systems. GAO‑24‑106179. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2024.

Federal Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve the Transfer of Personnel Security Clearances and Other Vetting Determinations. GAO‑24‑105669. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2024.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Needs a Reliable Schedule and Cost Estimate for the National Background Investigation Services Program. GAO‑23‑105670. Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2023.

Personnel Vetting: DOD Should Improve Management and Operation of Its Background Investigation Working Capital Fund. GAO‑23‑105812. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2023.

High-Risk Series: Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address All Areas. GAO‑23‑106203. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2023.

Personnel Vetting: Actions Needed to Implement Reforms, Address Challenges, and Improve Planning. GAO‑22‑104093. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 2021.

High Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas. GAO‑21‑119SP. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2021.

Federal Management: Selected Reforms Could Be Strengthened by Following Additional Planning, Communication, and Leadership Practices. GAO‑20‑322. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2020.

High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas. GAO‑19‑157SP. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2019.

Personnel Security Clearances: Additional Actions Needed to Implement Key Reforms and Improve Timely Processing of Investigations. GAO‑18‑431T. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2018.

Personnel Security Clearances: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Quality, Address Timeliness, and Reduce Investigation Backlog. GAO‑18‑29. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2017.

Personnel Security Clearances: Plans Needed to Fully Implement and Oversee Continuous Evaluation of Clearance Holders. GAO‑18‑117. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2017.

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